In July, Pakistan's Parliamentary Committee on National Security formally approved talks between the government of Pakistan and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan.
The army leadership briefed Parliament that they were forced to talk to the TTP to keep the TTP away from an alliance with the Islamic State of Khorasan, which would have proved disastrous for Pakistan's internal security. The Parliamentary Committee on National Security also formed a 27-member Parliamentary Monitoring Committee to take the negotiation process forward. Pakistan and TTP talks are taking place in Afghanistan under the mediation of Taliban.
There is currently an indefinite ceasefire as the parties continue their negotiations. The committee was told that around 30,000 TTP workers and their families are living in Afghanistan who could be sent back if a final deal is reached. Of course, all conflicts can be resolved through peace talks. However, if states are forced to make unilateral concessions to violent radical groups for the sake of peace, they are actually giving them opportunities to flourish. On the one hand, such compromises legitimize such groups as real stakeholders in the system, while on the other hand, it gives them opportunities to undermine the system by spreading their roots and ideological narratives.
If the pros and cons of unilateral peace deals with violent rebel groups are carefully considered, it becomes clear that no deal is better than a bad deal. The analogy and comparison that is being sought between the negotiations with the Taliban and Pakistan's TTP is not correct. A more apt analogy is the Kabul government's negotiations with the Taliban, or intra-Afghan negotiations, which failed. Currently, the talks between Pakistan and the TTP are deadlocked as both sides stick to their respective tough stances. Pakistan also sent Mufti Taqi Usmani, a prominent religious scholar of the Deobandi school of thought, who is highly respected among the Taliban, to persuade the TTP to show flexibility.
In contrast, the TTP sought integration of the former FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, the implementation of Sharia law and a reduction in the number of Pakistani troops in the region, along with financial compensation and amnesty for its operatives. is demanding. Moreover, the TTP is not ready to dismantle its organizational structure or disarm itself. Pakistan should carefully review the outcome of the peace agreement with the TTP. The group has felt energized since the US withdrawal and the restoration of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Since then there has been a dramatic increase in TTP attacks against Pakistani security forces in the Pak-Afghan border region.
The TTP claimed more than 282 attacks against Pakistani security forces. Similarly, in the first quarter of 2022, TTP has killed more than 79 Pakistani security personnel. The TTP's continuous attacks and the Taliban's refusal to act against them forced Pakistan to negotiate with the TTP. Pakistan's first attempt to reach a peace deal failed when the TTP unilaterally ended a month-long ceasefire last November. In his recent statement, TTP chief Noor Wali Mehsud compared the expected agreement with Pakistan to the 2020 Doha Agreement between the US and the Taliban.
Wali said that Pakistan is facing a similar situation vis-a-vis TTP as America faced against Taliban in Afghanistan. Like the Taliban, they are presenting the deal as a victory for the TTP. In the event of a deal, the TTP will use this triumphant narrative to increase its influence in Pakistani society and recruit new members to the organization. If the TTP is allowed a Taliban-style sharia system in FATA, with or without the region's integration into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, radical groups will portray it as an effect of the Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan.
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